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Abstract 
This article attempts to historically analyse the emergence of  transnational 
jihadist movements in Indonesia, focusing on Jamaah Islamiyyah (JI), which 
is allegedly responsible for a number of  terror attacks in South East Asia. 
The article discusses the historical background of  the emergence of  Jamaah 
Islamiyyah and its current development. It is argued that the Afghan battle-field 
was an important event and locus for Indonesian jihadits groups to exercise their 
military capabilities, establish secure bases and subsequently pave the emergence 
of  the transnational jihadist. Through informal networks and joint operations, 
Jamaah Islamiyyah has become the hub for jihadist movements in Southeast 
Asia. It was the political opportunity of  the reformation which gave way to the 
public appearance of  Jamaah Islamiyyah as the MMI demonstrated, but it also 
brought the consequence of  a split among JI activists. The split reappears when 
the MMI was becoming involved in politics, and the resignation of  Ba’asyir 
from the top position of  the MMI in 2008 exemplifies the turning point to the 
ideological foundation of  JI as the Pedoman Umum Perjuangan Jamaah 
Islamiyyah (PUPJI) prescribed. 
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A. Introduction
On 18 February 2002, the former Prime Minister of  Singapore, 
Lee Kwan Yew, called Indonesia “a nest of  terrorists” and accused 
Abu Bakar Ba’asyir of  being the leader of  the most dangerous terrorist 
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organisation in Southeast Asia, Jamaah Islamiyyah.1 His words led to 
many responses from the Indonesian government and Indonesian 
Islamic organisations. The Indonesian Foreign Minister condemned Yew’s 
statement as provocative and an accusation without any evidence, later 
sending a diplomatic note to the former Minister of  Singapore. A number 
of  Indonesian Islamic organisations took to the streets, demonstrating in 
front of  the Embassy of  Singapore and accusing Mr. Yew of  interfering 
in Indonesian politics.2 
Most Indonesians, including moderate Muslim leaders, were 
very reluctant to acknowledge the radicals’ activities in Indonesia.3 The 
2002 Tempo Magazine survey revealed 32 percent of  Indonesians were 
reluctant to acknowledge the existence of  terrorist groups in Indonesia, 
yet 64 percent said otherwise. One year later, Tempo held another poll, 
focusing on the role of  Jamaah Islamiyyah in the Marriott bombing. It 
revealed that 48 percent of  respondents believed that Jamaah Islamiyyah 
was responsible for the blast, while 46 percent said otherwise.4 Both 
mentioned statistical data illustrate the decrease in the number of  
Indonesians who acknowledged the existence of  the most dangerous 
militant Muslim groups in Southeast Asia. A similar pattern is found 
in the public opinion on the role of  Abu Bakar Ba’asyir in certain 
bombings in Indonesia. The 2003 Tempo poll showed that 61 percent 
of  the respondents assumed that he was involved in the attacks5 and the 
number decreased to 43 percent when Tempo held another poll on the 
same topic in 2004.6 To put this in a broader context, the above statistics 
might indicate the negative effect of  the United States’ war on terrorism 
and the military invasion of  Afghanistan and Iraq. Moreover, the poll’s 
1 “Mozaik Teror Antar-Bangsa”, in Tempo Magazine, Ed. 30/XXXI/23-29 
September 2002 and “Lee Menuding, Jakarta Meradang”, in Tempo Magazine, Ed. 52/
XXX/25 February- 03 March 2002.
2 “Mister Lee, Mana Buktinya?”, in Tempo Magazine, Ed. 01/XXXI/04-10 March 
2002.
3 R. William Liddle, “al-Faruq dan Indonesia”, in Tempo Magazine, Ed. 33/
XXXI/14 - 20 October 2002.
4 “Pengakuan JI yang Kurang Meyakinkan”, in Tempo Magazine, Ed. 25/XXX-
II/18 - 24 August 2003.
5 “Presumed Guilty”in Tempo Magazine, Ed. 50/XXX/11 - 17 February 2003. 
6 “Keragu-raguan atas Abu Bakar Ba’asyir”, in Tempo Magazine, Ed. 37/XXX-
III/08-14 November 2004. 
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findings also suggest the successful campaign of  many radical Indonesian 
Muslim organisations to drive public opinion to deny the presence of  
the Islamic radical movement, Jamaah Islamiyyah7, and towards “winning 
the hearts and the minds of  the people”.8
This article attempts to present a comprehensive picture of  a radical 
Muslim organisation which is accused of  being responsible for many 
terror attacks. The discussion will begin with the historical background 
of  Jamaah Islamiyyah, networks establishment and then to its current 
development during the Indonesian Reformation era (Era Reformasi).
B. The Historical Background of  the Establishment of  Jamaah 
Islamiyyah
Jamaah Islamiyyah takes its roots from Kartosuwiryo’s struggle 
to establish an Indonesian Islamic state in the 1940s. Kartosuwiryo 
(1907-1962) is not an ulama in the traditional religious sense, but a 
student of  a medical school in Surabaya in the 1920s, a period in which 
he became a close friend to Oemar Said Tjokroaminoto, president of  
the Indonesian Islamic Sarekat Party (Partai Sarekat Islam Indonesia/
PSII). Kartosuwiryo grew to prefer Islam, instead of  nationalism, and 
proclaimed the Indonesian Islamic State, Darul Islam (DI), on 7 August 
1949. After his 14 August 1945 proclamation of  an Islamic state, which 
Kartosuwiryo himself  revoked a few days later, he adhered to the 
leadership of  Sukarno and joined the Masyumi (Majlis Syuro Muslimin 
Indonesia) Party.9
7 Hundreds Islamic radical organisations, like Front Pembela Islam (Islamic 
Front Defender), Komite Indonesia untuk Dunia Islam  (Indonesian Committee for 
Islamic World) and Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia (MMI), contested the existence of  
militant organisations, initially that are responsible for violence and terror actions. They 
accused Israel and the US of  being behind the attacks to discredit Muslims. In doing 
so, they came into the street and campaigned through media.
8 Cees van Dijk, “The Hearts and the Minds of  the People: Southeast Asia After 
11 September 2001”, paper at International Seminar: Islamic Militant Movements in Southeast 
Asia, Jakarta, 22-23 July 2003.
9 The accuracy of  the 14 August 1945 proclamation of  the Indonesian Islamic 
state, according to van Dijk, is doubtful because the geographical position of  Jakarta 
relative to the area around Banten and Tasikmalaya where Kartosuwiryo was a supervi-
sor of  a Japanese-sponsored guerrilla training programme. Rumours of  a forthcoming 
Japanese surrender in fact were confined to Jakarta and did not reach either Banten 
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The confrontation between Kartosuwiryo and the Indonesian state 
began in early 1948 when the Siliwangi division of  the regular army was 
withdrawn from West Java in accordance with the Renville Agreement 
between the central government and the Dutch. Kartosuwiryo led his 
Hizbullah10 unit to carry out guerrilla attacks and in January 1948, the 
group established itself  as the Islamic Army of  Indonesia (Tentara Islam 
Indonesia/TII). The tension was at its highest on 22 October 1950 when 
he demanded that President Sukarno abandon both Communism and 
Nationalism, return to Islam as the only ideology, and make al-Qur’an 
and the sunna (the Prophet’s tradition) the constitution of  his new Islamic 
republic. 
In the 1950s, the Darul Islam rebellion spread widely across the 
archipelago.11 In South Sulawesi, Abdul Qahhar Mudzakkar joined Darul 
or Tasikmalaya. See, C. van Dijk, Rebellion Under the Banner of  Islam: The Darul Islam in 
Indonesia (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1981), p. 14, B.J. Boland, The Struggle of  Islam in 
Modern Indonesia (The Hague: Martinus Nijhof, 1982) p. 57, Keat Gin Ooi, Southeast Asia: 
A Historical Encyclopedia, from Angkor Wat to East Timor Vol. I (A-G) (California: Santa 
Barbara, 2004), p. 401 and Henri J.H. Alers, Om Een Rode of  Grone Merdeka (Eindhoven: 
Uitgeverij Vulkaan Eindhoven, 1956), p. 240.
10 Hizbullah is an irregular unit of  the army founded by Islamic leaders in 1944 
as a response to the Japanese-sponsored self  defence units, the Defenders of  Homeland 
(Pembela Tanah Air/Peta). It was a military unit with a complicated structure with many 
smaller factions inside, such as Muhammadiyah and Nahdlatul Ulama. Kartosuwiryo 
was the leader of  a small faction in the unit. Refusing to go along with an agreement 
arrived at by the other nationalists with the Dutch that would have required the with-
drawal of  revolutionary forces from parts of  Java, Kartosuwiryo led his unit to battle 
against the Dutch.  In the following years, Kartosuwiryo’s Hizbullah was part of  the 
military rivalry between the regular and irregular forces, between armed forces led by 
Dutch and Japanese-trained officers. Ruth McVey, “The Post-Revolutionary Trans-
formation of  the Indonesian Army”, Indonesia, 11 (April 1971), p. 138, Martin van 
Bruinessen, Genealogies of  Islamic Radicalism in post-Suharto Indonesia”in http://
www.let.uu.nl/~Martin.vanBruinessen/personal/publications/genealogies_islamic_radicalism.htm 
(accessed, 17 July 2008), Cees Van Dijk, Rebellion Under the Banner of  Islam: The Darul 
Islam in Indonesia, (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1981), Pinardi, Sekarmadji Maridjan 
Kartosuwirjo (Jakarta: Aryaguna, 1964), pp. 27-8, C.A.O. van Nieuwenhuijze, Aspects of  
Islam in Post Colonial Indonesia (The Hague: W. van Hoeve, 1958), p. 168.
11 Darul Islam, according to Conboy, also attracted support from  US Intelligence 
with a paramilitary program. The training was intended to restrain the ongoing power-
ful attraction of  communism in Indonesia and to trigger a Muslim reaction towards 
the Soekarno presidency as well. See Ken Conboy, INTEL: Inside Indonesia’s Intelligence 
Service (Jakarta: Equinox Publishing, 2004), p. 139.
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Islam in 1950 and was subsequently named National Deputy Minister 
of  Defence of  Darul Islam, leading a guerrilla war against the state. 
On 14 May 1963, Mudzakkar proclaimed the independence of  East 
Indonesia as the Islamic Federated Republic of  Indonesia (Republik 
Persatuan Islam Indonesia/RPII) with its centre in South Sulawesi.12 
Following Mudzakkar, Daud Beureuh, the leader of  the Union of  All 
Acehnese Ulama (Persatuan Ulama-ulama Seluruh Aceh/PUSA), joined 
Darul Islam on 20 September 1953 on the twin grounds of  preventing 
Aceh’s absorption into the province of  North Sumatra and the failure 
of  the republic to implement Islamic law. The armed guerrilla war 
of  Kartosuwiryo ended when the government launched a vigorous 
anti-guerrilla campaign in the period 1960-1962 and killed the leader. 
Mudzakkar’s rebellion was halted on 3 February 1965 when he was 
killed in Lasolo, and Beureuh’s campaign was finally brought to an end 
in 1962 through negotiations between the central government and Aceh 
rebel forces.13 As a result, Aceh was granted “Special Region” (Daerah 
Istimewa) status and the central government promised broad autonomy in 
the areas of  religion, custom (adat) and education.14 However, the rebels 
then encouraged Hassan Tiro to declare the establishment of  the Aceh 
Independence Movement (Gerakan Aceh Merdeka/GAM) in 1976.15
12 Tihami, M. A. Darul Islam di Masserengpulu: Studi Tentang Perubahan Sosial dan 
Keagamaan di Malua, Enrekang, Sulawesi Selatan (Makassar: Pusat latihan dan Penelitian 
Ilmu-ilmu Sosial, Hassanuddin University, 1984), p. 58, Abdul Qahhar Mudzakkar, 
Konsepsi Negara Demokrasi Indonesia: Koreksi Pemikiran Politik Pemerintahan Soekarno (Ja-
karta: Darul Falah, 1960).
13 Anhar Gonggong, Abdul Qahhar Mudzakkar: dari Patriot hingga Pemberontak 
(Yogyakarta: Ombak, 2004), p. 339.
14 Rizal Sukma, “Secessionist Challenge in Aceh: Problems and Prospects” in 
Hadi Soesatro, at. al. (ed.), Governance in Indonesia: Challenges Facing the Megawati Presi-
dency (Singapore: Institute of  Southeast Asian Studies, 2003), pp. 165-166 and Arskal 
Salim, “‘Sharia from below’ in ACEH (1930s-1960s): Islamic identity and the right to 
self-determination with comparative reference to the Moro Islamic Liberation Front 
(MILF)”, Indonesia and the Malay World, Vol. 32, No. 92, March 2004, pp. 80-99.
15 Different from Baureuh, Tiro was a former soldier who was disturbed by 
the way central authorities managed the natural resources of  Aceh. He advocated for 
independence, not for religious purposes –if  not to mention for the implementation 
of  shari>’ah- as Beureuh demonstrated but for economic and political reasons. Anthony 
Reid, An Indonesian Frontier: Acehnese and Other Histories of  Sumatra (Singapore: Singapore 
University Press, 2005), p. 341 and Michelle Ann Miller, “The Nangroes Aceh Darus-
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As with Kartosuwiro, Mudzakkar and Beureuh, Masyumi was an 
Islamic party with the ideal of  establishing an Indonesian Islamic state 
through implementing shari>’a (Islamic Law). Instead of  waging guerrilla 
war as Darul Islam, Masyumi had its own way of  achieving this ideal: they 
sought to do so democratically and constitutionally.16 Since the abrogation 
of  what would later be known as the “Seven Words formulation” of  
the Jakarta Charter, stating “Belief  in Almighty God with the obligation 
for its Muslim citizens to carry out the Islamic law (Ketuhanan yang maha 
Esa dengan kewajiban menjalankan syariah Islam bagi pemeluk-pemeluknya)”, 
from the 1945 Indonesian constitution,17 Masyumi had demanded the 
re-application of  the Jakarta Charter and opposed Soekarno due to 
his alliance with the Indonesian Communist Party (Partai Komunis 
Indonesia/PKI). 
It was Prime Minister Muhammad Natsir who led Masyumi and 
became the leader in the struggle against communism in the 1950s. He 
also engaged in a campaign against Sukarno, whom he considered to be 
in favour of  nationalism and secularism instead of  Islam. The conflict 
between Natsir and Soekarno reached its peak after the 1955 election, 
which placed the Indonesian Communist Party in the fourth position in the 
election result, below the Indonesian Nationalist Party (Partai Nasionalis 
salam Law: a Serious Response to Aceh”, Asian Ethnicity, 15 (13), 2004, p. 343.
16 B.J. Boland, The Struggle of  Islam, p. 43 and David Jenkins, Suharto and His Gen-
erals; Indonesia Military Politics 1975-1983 (Ithaca, New York: Cornel Modern Indonesia 
Project, 1984), p. 9.
17 On 22 June 1945, nine leading Indonesian leaders –known as “Nine Co-
ordinators” (Panitia Sembilan)- collaborating in a Committee for the preparation of  
Indonesian Independence (Panitia Persiapan Kemerdekaan Indonesia/PPKI) had suc-
cessfully drafted a constitution for a newly established republic. The draft is the second 
version of  Pancasila -known as the Jakarta Charter (Piagam Jakarta)- and a reaction to 
the preceding version of  Pancasila, which the future Indonesian president, Sukarno, 
promulgated in his speech known as “The Birth of  the Pancasila” on 1 June 1945. On 
18 August 1945, due to the objection of  some political leaders, mainly those from the 
Eastern part of  Indonesia of  which a majority are Christians, the PPKI changed the 
formulation of  the first sentence of  Pancasila by removing the words “with the obliga-
tion of  its Muslim citizens to carry out the shari>’a”. The first Sila became “Ketuhanan 
Yang Maha Esa” (the unity of  God). Read, Jackson, Karl D., Traditional Authority, Islam 
and Rebellion: A Study of  Indonesian Political Behaviour (Berkeley: University of  California 
Press, 1980), p. 9 and Ahmad Syafi’i Ma’arif, Islam dan Politik; Teori Belah Bambu, Masa 
Depan Demokrasi Terpimpin (1959-1965) (Jakarta: Gema Insani Press, 1996), p. 29.
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Indonesia/PNI), Masyumi and Nahdlatul Ulama. The tension became 
increasingly heated after the 1957 regional elections, which placed the 
Indonesian Communist Party in the leading position in East Java. Finally 
on 15 February 1958, Natsir and many Indonesian Army officers, who at 
the time felt that Soekarno was a threat to Indonesian democracy and so 
were anti-Soekarno, proclaimed the establishment of  the Revolutionary 
Government of  the Indonesian Republic (Pemerintahan Revolusioner 
Republik Indonesia/PRRI) in Padang, West Sumatera.18 After Masyumi’s 
involvement in PRRI, in the late 1950s, Sukarno proclaimed Masyumi 
an illegal party and officially forbade its leaders to hold their activities. 
Some of  its leaders, such as Muhammad Natsir, were jailed and released 
in the 1960s.
The ideal of  establishing an “Islamic state” had been the key notion 
of  debate in the two decades of  Indonesian independence. Proponents 
of  an Indonesian Islamic state contested the idea of  a “Pancasila”19 state 
which had become the Indonesian ideology since the independence, 
bridging a theocratic state, if  not to mention an Islamic state, on the one 
hand and a secular state on the other. It was through the Jakarta Charter 
that Islamic proponents found themselves with the right political issue to 
revive the idea of  an Islamic state. The aim of  the debate over the charter 
was to ensure the appliance of  Islamic law for Indonesian Muslim citizens, 
a political issue which nationalists, communists and non-Muslim groups 
were against. The heated debate culminated in 1959 when the Constituent 
Assembly (Majelis Konstituante) failed to reach a consensus concerning 
the state ideology and insisted that Soekarno would declare his “Guided 
Democracy” (1959-1965) by which the latter brought democracy under 
the authority of  the president, closed the debate over the state ideology 
and announced a return to the 1945 constitution and Pancasila.
The presidential attitudes further generated strong opposition from 
Islamic groups and crystallised the demand for a democratic governmental 
system and a change of  regime. The tension was exacerbated by concern 
18 R.Z Leirissa, “PRRI: Membangun Indonesia Tanpa Komunis (Building In-
donesia without Communist)” in Tempo Magazine, Ed. 21/XXXVII/14 - 20 July 2008. 
19 Pancasila literally means “five pillars”. It contains five principles; a belief  in 
one Supreme being, a just and civilised humanitarianism, the unity of  Indonesia, a 
people led by wise policies arrived at through a process of  consultation and consensus 
and a commitment to social justice for all Indonesians.
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about the ongoing influential role of  the Indonesian Communist Party 
at a grassroots level, threatening the authority of  the religious elites 
(ulama) and the Indonesian Army. In addition, the state economy was 
in collapse and there was competition among leaders of  the Indonesian 
Army;20 between the pro-Islam and nationalist cum communist factions. 
All together these concerns inflamed the opposition towards Soekarno.
It is worth mentioning that other factors contributing to the harsh 
opposition to Soekarno included the beginning of  the Vietnam War in 
the late 1960s, the intensification of  the Cold war in Southeast Asia21 and 
outside intervention, especially by the United States, which feared that 
communism would spread, domino-like, throughout Southeast Asia.22 
As Anderson noted, the result of  this fear was a series of  U.S. initiatives 
aimed at incorporating Southeast Asian countries within its sphere 
of  influence. Generally, these involved ‘‘creating loyal, capitalistically 
prosperous, authoritarian anti-communist regimes –typically, but not 
invariably, dominated by the military’’.23 
The opposition culminated in the bloody events of  the 30th of  
September, in which six generals were killed during a night attack, 
20 Nasution was the mastermind behind the conflict within the Indonesian 
Army during the 1950s-1960s. On 11 November 1958, after being reappointed the 
chief  of  the Indonesian army staff, he gave a speech on the position of  the army in 
society, being placed in all sectors and at the highest levels of  government (the seed of  
the dual functions-dwi-fungsi of  the Indonesian army during the New Order regime). 
Nasution’s concern was to ensure that the military continued to exercise an influence 
in decision making and to keep the increasingly powerful Indonesian Communist Party 
at bay. He reportedly attended religious gatherings, gave sermons at Islamic feasts and 
invited Muslims to tackle the coming danger of  communism. The conflict within the 
army culminated when, in mid 1962, Achmad Yani replaced his position and pledged 
to unite himself  (menyatukan diri) “with the leadership of  Bung Karno”. Read, David 
Jenkins, Suharto and His Generals, p. 2-3 and Cees van Dijk, “the Resilience of  Islam 
under Guided Democracy”, unpublished Paper, presented at the seminar of  Studiying 
Islam in Southeast Asia: State of  the Art and New Approaches, Leiden, 7-8 July 2008.
21 M. Ricklefs, A History of  Modern Indonesia (Houndmills: Macmillan, 1981), 
pp. 259-269.
22 W.W. Rostow, “The Case for the Vietnam War” in Parameters, Winter, 1996-
1997, p. 39-50.
23 Benedict Anderson, “From Miracle to Crash” in London Review of  Books, Vol. 
20/8, 1998, p. 16 and Donald S. Zagoria, ”Who Fears the Domino Theory?” in Survival, 
10:6 (June, 1968), p.184. 
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allegedly as part of  a coup by the Communist Party. Though Suharto 
may or may not have secretly instigated the coup, he rapidly gained 
advantages from the ensuing political clash. He encouraged rumours 
about the dangers of  communism and the communists’ plan to kill their 
enemies as demonstrated by the September coup. Consequently, Suharto 
was able to cultivate a “kill or be killed” atmosphere that incited people 
and set them up against communists.24 
It was on 11 March 1966 that M. Jusuf, Brigadir Amir Machmud, 
and Brigadir Jendral Basuki Rahmat insisted that Soekarno, who was in 
Bogor at the time, should sign a letter in which the president would give 
General Suharto permission to take all steps necessary for the safety and 
stability of  the state and government. The letter of  the so-called the Order 
of  March the Eleventh (Surat Perintah Sebelas Maret/Supersemar) caused 
a long tug-of-war between the president and the new leader concerning 
the duration of  the transfer of  authority. One year later, on 12 March 
1967, Soeharto became the “acting president” and on 27 March 1969 
was officially declared president for the next five years. The downfall 
of  Soekarno signalled the end of  the Old Order and emergence of  the 
New Order under Suharto. 
The political position of  the New Order in the first decade of  its 
political power was not as simple as it may seem. The government was 
traumatised by the ideological debates during the Old Order and also 
concerned about the existence of  potentially rebellious Islamic groups. 
In order to secure his political position, Suharto decided first of  all 
to stop the re-establishment of  Masyumi by infiltrating the party. Ali 
Murtopo, the state intelligence chief, was the man behind the thwarting 
of  the efforts of  ex-Masyumi leaders, such as Sjafruddin Prawiranegara, 
Assaat, Prawoto Mangkusasmito, Moh. Roem, Kasman Singodimejo, 
Hamka dan Mohammad Natsir, to reinstall the Masyumi through the 
Coordinated Association of  Muslim’s Efforts (Badan Koordinasi Amal 
24 During the 1965s, one hundred thousand to two million people, allegedly all 
Communist Party members, were killed. Hundreds of  Islamic organisations, mainly the 
paramilitary body of  Nahdlatul Ulama, the Anshar, as well as local gangsters such as jago, 
jawara and blater were involved in the genocide. Robert Cribb, “Unresolved Problems 
in the Indonesian Killings of  1965-1966” in Asian Survey, Vol. 42, No. 4, The Legacy 
of  Violence in Indonesia (Jul. - Aug., 2002), pp. 552.
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Muslimin/BKAM).25 However, on 5 February 1969, the New Order 
government agreed to the establishment of  the Indonesian Muslim Party 
(Partai Muslimin Indonesia/Parmusi) and in exchange, the government 
forbade former Masyumi leaders from leading the Parmusi. Due to the 
massive campaign by Golongan Karya (Golkar) in the 1971 election, 
not to mention intimidation by the government in support of  Golkar, 
Parmusi lost and only managed to reach the fourth position after the 
Golkar, the Indonesian Nationalist Party (Partai Nasionalis Indonesia/
PNI) and Nahdlatul Ulama.26
Through a variety of  means, Suharto also sent Ali Murtopo’s 
Special Operations (Operasi Khusus/Opsus) to join forces with the Islamic 
state proponents in order to pull them onto his side, to then discredit 
them and make Golkar the winner of  the 1977 election. Initially, Murtopo 
used the revived communism issue, after the Vietnam War ended in the 
1970s, to make contact with the former leaders of  Darul Islam, who 
were offered amnesty in 1963. In 1965, an Opsus officer, A. Sugiyanto 
established contact with Danu Mohammad Hasan, a high-ranking Darul 
Islam officer from West Java.27 Danu would later become the commander 
of  Regional Command III of  the Jihad Command (Komando Jihad) 
covering West Java. Further, Murtopo assigned Major Pitut Soeharto to 
handle the Jihad Command. As Opsus would later be dissolved within the 
newly-created State Coordinating Intelligence Agency (Badan Koordinasi 
Intelejen Negara/Bakin), Pitut would then lead the Special Operation 
(Operasi Khusus/Opsus) Directorate under Bakin’s Deputy III, controlling 
the Jihad Command portfolio. In 1974, Danu was promoted to head 
the Java command and Haji Ismail Pranoto, alias Hispran, along with 
Kartosuwiryo’s son, Dodo Mohammad Darda became the commander 
25 The Coordinated Association of  Muslim Efforts (Badan Koordinasi Amal 
Muslimin/BKAM) founded on 16 December 1965 consists of  sixteen Indonesian 
Muslim Organisations, among  which are Muhammadiyah, Persatuan Islam (Persis), 
al-Irsyad, Persatuan Umat Islam, al-Ittihadiyah and Gabungan Serikat-serikat Buruh 
Islam Indonesia (Gasbindo). Hartono Mardjono, Politik Indonesia 1996-2003 (Jakarta: 
Gema Insani Press, 1996), pp. 26-31.
26 Abdul Azis Thaba, Islam dan Negara dalam Politik Orde Baru (Jakarta: Gema 
Insani Press, 1996), pp. 246-247.
27 David Jenkins, Suharto and His Generals, pp. 56-60 and Ken Conboy, INTEL: 
Inside Indonesia’s Intelligence Service, , p. 140.
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and the chief  of  staff  respectively.28
Sometime in December 1976, Hispran and Taufiq, who introduced 
themselves as the representatives of  Bakin, visited Pesantren Ngruki, 
an Islamic boarding school which Sungkar and Ba’asyir founded on 
10 March 1972 and invited both clerics to join a movement which was 
intended to tackle the coming danger of  communism in Indonesia.29 In 
that meeting, both Sungkar and Ba’asyir pledged an allegiance (bai’a)30 
to join the struggle with Hispran, who installed Sungkar as the head of  
Jamaah Anshorullah, a Jihad Command’s branch operation in Central 
Java, and Ba’asyir as the vice leader.31
However, the government’s plan to subjugate Sungkar and 
Ba’asyir was not successful. Instead of  using the Jihad Command or 
Jamaah Ansharullah, Sungkar and Ba’asyir preferred to use “Jamaah 
28 The government’s infiltration was not long lasting. Beginning in 1975, Anton 
Ngenget, a former member of  the Indonesian Communist Party turned government 
informant, had been reporting that members of  the Soviet Union consulate in Sura-
baya were encouraging the Indonesian Communist Party remnants to foster contact 
with the Jihad Command and Moscow was reportedly willing to provide military aid. 
Furthermore, that Jihad Command members would choose a Muslim party, the United 
Development Party (Partai Persatuan Pembangunan/PPP), not the Golkar in the 1977 
election, made the government more open to attacking the group. In January 1977, 
four months ahead of  the polls, security officials went on an offensive and eventually 
detained 185 persons by mid-year. Andrianus Harsawaskita and Evan A. Laksmana, 
“Rethinking Terrorism in Indonesia: Lessons from the 2002 Bali Bombing”, UNISCI 
Discussion Paper, No. 5 (October 2007), pp. 73-74, Ken Conboy, INTEL: Inside Indone-
sia’s Intelligence Service, pp. 144-5 and “Diakah Sang Imam?”, in Tempo Magazine, Ed. 35/
XXXI/28 October-03 November 2002. 
29 The Court Report of  Sungkar’s and Ba’asyir’s trial in 1982, pp. 85-90.
30 The bai’a text was the same text as the bai’a text which Kartosuwiyo made in 
the 1940s, calling for the establishment of  an Islamic state. It contains the following: 
“Bismillahirrahmannirrahim” “Ashadu ala Illaha Ilalloh, wa Ashaduanna Muhammadarrosu-
lullah”. I pledge allegiance to Allah, that I will obey my leader of  Jamaah Mujahiddin Anshorullah 
as long as my leader obeys God and His messenger. And I promise and will always be (obeying): 1) 
Not to consider any ally beside Allah, 2) To conduct Shalat, 3) To fast in Ramadan, 4) Committing 
to all matters that Allah and His Messenger have already obliged and to restrain for committing all 
that they have prohibited, 5) Committing to struggle in establishing God’s religion…Allahu Akbar...
Allahu Akbar... Allahu Akbar.
31 Sungkar denied the bai’a accusation which was voiced in the court. He 
acknowledged that the confession that he pledged allegiance to Hispran was due to 
pressure and torture. Ba’asyir mentioned the same. See, Sungkar’s Speech in his 1982 
court (10 March 1982), p. 14 and Ba’asyir Speech in his 1982 court (10 March 1982).
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Islamiyyah”, naming their activities, and established networks with other 
former members of  Darul Islam, such as Drs. Nuri Suharsono, Yusuf  
Latif  and Abdul Qadir Baraja. The base for its political activities was 
in the salafi-pesantren of  al-Mukmin, Ngruki. The activities of  Jamaah 
Islamiyyah included publications and religious sermons which were held 
in Ngadiluwih, Matesih, and Karanganyar on each full moon of  every 
month, often called Pengajian Sidi. 
In the late 1970s, Ba’asyir circulated Risalah Jihad dan Hijrah (The 
Path of  Jihad and hijra) which was written by his father-in-law, Abdul 
Qadir Baraja. It contains an explanation of  the legal status of  jihad in 
Islam and the obligation for Muslims to wage war against those who 
opposed the implementation of  Islamic law in Indonesia. And in October 
1976, Sungkar delivered a speech at the central mosque of  Surakarta in 
which he publicly campaigned against participating in the 1977 elections 
and called for Golongan Putih/Golput (not to vote in the election). On 20 
January 1978, Sungkar and Ba’asyir, in one of  their sermons, publicly 
acknowledged and invited audiences to implement all aspects of  the 
shari>’a, and to replace both Pancasila and the 1945 Indonesia Constitution 
with al-Qur’an and the sunna, but not the Jakarta Charter, which eventually 
also appeared in their court explanations as a legitimate foundation and a 
reason for their declarations.32 Due to their declarations, the Indonesian 
Police Department seized Sungkar on 10 November 1978 and Ba’asyir 
eleven days later on three counts: their involvement in the Indonesia 
Islamic State movement, their campaign against the Pancasila and 
persuading people not to participate in the election.
Following their detention, a series of  violent crimes took place, 
all tied to people from Ngruki and Jamaah Islamiyyah. In January 1979, 
Musa Warman killed the assistant rector of  the Eleventh of  March 
University (Universitas Sebelas Maret) in Solo. The victim, according to 
the court documents, was accused of  revealing the existence of  Jamaah 
Islamiyyah to the authorities and therefore being responsible for the 
arrest of  Sungkar and Ba’asyir. Warman reportedly also planned to kill the 
judge and prosecutor responsible for the conviction of  Hispran who was 
32 Court’s exceptions with the title “Idiologi Negara Pancasila, Gerakan Komunisme 
dan Ajaran Islam” (Ideology of  Pancasila State, Communist Movement and Islam), of  
Sungkar and Ba’asyir in 1982. 
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sentenced to life in prison for his Jihad Command activities in 1978. On 
1 March 1979, Warman and a Ngruki teacher, Abdullah Umar, robbed a 
car that was used for transporting salaries of  teachers at the State Islamic 
Institute of  Sunan Kalijaga of  Yogyakarta. On 21 March 1979, Warman 
and Umar attempted a second robbery in Malang. However, this attempt 
failed. Both robberies were undertaken on the basis of  fa’i, raising funds 
by attacking enemies of  Islam.33 
In their 1982 court appearance, both Sungkar and Ba’asyir 
acknowledged that they were frustrated by the New Order’s use of  force 
towards Islamic groups to create acceptance of  the Pancasila as the sole 
ideology (asas tunggal). Furthermore, the prohibition of  ex-Masyumi 
leaders, such as M. Natsir and M. Roem, from participation in the Parmusi 
was considered as a plan of  the government to defeat Islamic proponents. 
They were also frustrated by the illegitimate efforts of  the government 
to persuade Indonesians to vote for the Golkar in the elections. 
Furthermore, they accused the government of  disseminating incorrect 
faith which could endanger the Islamic faith, such as conserving many 
National Heroes’ (Pahlawan Nasional) tombs and defining October 1st as 
the Celebration Day for the Sacred Pancasila (Hari Peringatan Kesaktian 
Pancasila).34 At the same time they acknowledged that they forbade their 
santri of  Ngruki to hold any flag-ceremonies (upacara bendera) or salute 
the Indonesian flag, which was considered bid‘a (innovation).35
In April 1982, the Regional Court (Pengadilan Negeri) of  Surakarta 
sentenced both Sungkar and Ba’asyir to nine years of  detention. Both 
appealed to the Provincial Court (Pengadilan Tinggi) which then reduced 
the sentence to three years and ten months detention, equivalent to 
their pre-trial detention, and they were released on 9 September 1982. 
The Provincial Court’s decision left Sungkar and Ba’ayir dissatisfied and 
they brought another appeal to the Supreme Court (Mahkamah Agung/
MA), concerning the Provincial Court’s decision. On 2 March 1985, 
when the Supreme Court was about to announce its decision, Sungkar 
33 International Crisis Group, al-Qaeda in Southeast Asia: the Case of  the “Ngruki 
Network” in Indonesia, Brussels, 8 August 2002, pp. 7-8.
34 Ibid., p. 11.
35 The Court Report of  Sungkar’s and Ba’asyir’s trial in 1982, p. 100.
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and Ba’asyir did not show up in the court and made hijra (fleeing)36 to 
Malaysia. According to Ba’asyir, his hijra was necessary because the 
government illegitimately forced Indonesians to accept the Pancasila as 
the sole ideology. As he could not accept the government’s programme 
and initially could not challenge it, Ba’asyir claimed that he had no choice 
but to make hijra.37
During their two years of  freedom in Central Java, prior to fleeing 
to Malaysia in 1985, Sungkar and Ba’asyir were able to extend Jamaah 
Islamiyyah’s network through ‘usra activists of  the Sudirman Mosque 
(Masjid Sudirman) in Yogyakarta. The Masjid Sudirman, often known 
as Masjid Colombo, is well-known for its Islamic preachers (muballigh) 
who were as devoted to opposing the Suharto regime as they were to the 
strict implementation of  shari>’a law. Among the well-known muballighs 
associated with the Sudirman mosque were Irfan S. Awwas, M. Iqbal 
Abdul Rahman alias Fihiruddin Muqti alias Abu Jibril Abdurahman who 
later joined Sungkar’s and Ba’asyir’s hijra in Malaysia and became the 
instructor of  the Abu Sayyaf  camp in Afghanistan and Muchliansyah, 
a Ngruki teacher.38 
In April 1985, Muchliansyah ordered Muzahar Muhtar, another 
activist from Masjid Sudirman, to accompany a group of  Islamic activists 
avoiding the New Order government’s oppression. The group included 
Sungkar, Ba’asyir and their loyalists, such as Fihiruddin Muqthie alias Abu 
Jibril Abdurrahman, Agus Sunarto, Ahmad Fallah, Rusli Aryus, Mubin 
36 Hijra means “to cut someone off  from friendly association” or “to avoid as-
sociation with”. Historically, it is a political concept used by the Prophet Muhammad 
in order to avoid struggle with the people in Mecca, making his hijra to Medina where 
he established an Islamic community which eventually was used to attack his homeland. 
Therefore, hijra is not only a withdrawing action from the surroundings, but also as a 
strategy to fight back. See, Watt, W. Montgomery. “Hidjra.” Encyclopaedia of  Islam. Edited 
by: P. Bearman, Th. Bianquis, C.E. Bosworth, E. van Donzel and W.P. Heinrichs. Brill, 
2008. Volume III, page 366, column 1.
37 Irfan Suryahardi Awwas, Dakwah dan Jihad Abu Bakar Ba’asyir (Yogyakarta: 
Wihdah Press, 2003), pp. 37-38, “Hilangnya Sungkar Dan Ba’asyir” (the Disappear-
ance of  Sungkar and Ba’asyir) in Tempo Magazine, 16 March 1985, p. 24, “Ragam Kisah 
Ba’asyir dan Jaringan Ngruki” (Various Stories About Ba’asyir and his Ngruki Network) 
in Tempo Magazine, Ed. 36/XXXI/04-10 November 2002 and Bilveer Singh, The Tali-
banization of  Southeast Asia: Losing the War on Terror to Islamist Extremists (Wesport etc.: 
Preager Security International, 2007), p. 63.
38 International Crisis Group, al-Qaeda in Southeast Asia, pp. 9.
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Bustami, Fajar Siddiq and Agung Riyadi.39 Without full documentation or 
with false passports they took a land-route through Lampung, Sumatera 
where they stopped by and founded another Jamaah Islamiyyah’s network, 
the so-called Mujahidin Community of  The Right Path of  Allah (Jamaah 
Mujahidin fi Sabilillah/JMF)40 whose ideal was to replace the Pancasila 
and the 1945 Indonesian Constitution with al-Qur’an and the sunna and 
to establish an Islamic state by overthrowing the legitimate government 
under Ba’asyir’s father-in-law, Abdul Qadir Baraja.41 
Upon their arrival in Malaysia, the group’s settlement was arranged 
by a son-in-law of  Abdul Qahhar Mudzakkar, Abdul Wahid Kadungga, 
one of  the founders and the first head of  the Europe-based Indonesian 
Muslim organisation, the Muslim Youth Association of  Europe (Persatuan 
Pemuda Muslim se-Eropa/PPME) founded on 12 April 1971.42 He was 
the one who first introduced Sungkar and Ba’asyir to the transnational 
networks of  Islamic movements.43
39 Ibid., pp. 11-12.
40 Tatik S. Hafidz, “The War on Terror and The Future of  Indonesian Democ-
racy”, unpublished paper at the Institute of  Defence and Strategic Studies Singapore, 
March 2003, p. 7.
41 “Gerakan Separatis Belum Usai” (the Unfinished Separatist Movements) in 
Tempo Magazine, 18-24 Agust 2003, p. 81 and Abdul Azis Thaba, Islam dan Negara, p. 277.
42 Kadungga was born in Palopo South Sulawesi, on 20 May 1940. He became 
a Dutch citizen living in Malaysia, neighbouring Sungkar and Ba’asyir in 1980s. In May 
1971, Kadungga travelled to several Middle Eastern countries, such as Syria and Jordan. 
On 30 June 1973, he attended the international conference of  the World Assembly of  
Muslim Youth (WAMY), the 1972 founded Saudi-affiliated Youth organisation, in Libya. 
In December 2002, he was arrested upon returning to Indonesia but was released after 
authorities ascertained that he had no role in the Bali bombings. PPME, The Muslim Youth 
Association of  Europe’s report, presented in the Indonesian Embassy in the Netherlands 
on 25-26 August 1973, pp. 1-11, “Abdul Wahid Kadungga: Akitivis Internasional”, 
in Suara Hidayatullah, October 2000 at http://www.hidayatullah.com/2001/10/siapa.
shtml, Zachari Abuza, Militant Islam in Southeast Asia: Crucible of  Terror (London: Lynne 
Rienner Publisher, Inc., 2003), pp. 126-127 and “Ragam Kisah Ba’asyir dan Jaringan 
Ngruki” (Various Stories About Ba’asyir and his Ngruki Network) in Tempo Magazine, 
Ed. 36/XXXI/04-10 November 2002 and “Sidney Jones: “Hambali Adalah Petinggi 
Al-Qaidah” (Sidney Jones: Hambali was al-Qaeda’s top leader) in Tempo Magazine, Ed. 
35/XXXI/28 October-03 November 2002.
43 “Jejak Ba’asyir di Sungai Manggis” (Ba’asyir’s Steps in Manggis River) in Tempo 
Magazine, Ed. 35/XXXI/28 October-03 November 2002.
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C. Establishing Networks
In August 1985, the exiles held a series of  meetings in which they 
decided to gain funds for the movement by asking their followers in 
Central Java to work in designated companies in Malaysia and turn over 
twenty percent of  their salaries to the “jamaah”.44 The exiles also decided 
to send Sungkar and Ba’asyir to Saudi Arabia to seek additional funds 
and, at the same time, decided to strengthen the Jamaah militarily by 
sending volunteers from Jakarta to be trained in Afghanistan. By 1987, 
the exiles had already sent six volunteers, supported by a Saudi-based 
foundation, the Rabit\a, to Pakistan’s and Afghanistan’s borders.45 The 
exiles’ settlements served as way stations for Indonesians and Malaysians 
who were on their way to study at one of  the forty al-Qaeda camps, the 
Jihad Fighters Academy of  Afghanistan (H{arbiy Pohatun Mujahidin-e-
Afghanistan Ittihad-e-Islamiy), run by the head of  the Tanzim Ittihad-
e-Islamiy Afghanistan, Abdul Robbir Rasul Sayyaf, and to participate in 
the Afghan war.46
The important person whose responsibility was to supply 
Indonesian cadres for training in Afghanistan was Ajengan Masduki, 
one of  the very few senior leaders of  Darul Islam with a Nahdlatul 
Ulama background.47 In 1986, when many leaders of  the Darul Islam 
were arrested, he was appointed to be the imām or ’amīr (leader). Upon 
becoming the imām, he made Haris the secretary, Abu Bakar Ba’asyir the 
minister of  justice and Abdullah Sungkar responsible for foreign affairs. 
44 It is not clear whether by “jamaah” they were referring to members of  the 
informal Ngruki network or to members of  Jamaah Islamiyyah, but according to Mu-
zahar who accompanied Sungkar and Ba’asyir in Malaysia in April 1985, the term refers 
to Jamaah Islamiyyah as an organisation which Sungkar and Ba’asyir founded prior 
to leaving Indonesia. International Crisis Group, al-Qaeda in Southeast Asia, pp. 11-2.
45 Ibid., p. 12.
46 Zachari Abuza, Militant Islam in Southeast Asia: Crucible of  Terror, op. cit, 127 and 
Nasir Abas, Membongkar Jamaah Islamiyah: Pengakuan Mantan Anggota JI (Jakarta: Grafindo 
Khazanah Ilmu, 2005), pp. 47-48.
47 Ajengan Masduki was born in Ciamis. In 1946, he fought in the Hizbullah 
unit against the Dutch and attended the 1946 Cisayeung, West Java meeting which 
laid the groundwork for the establishment of  Darul Islam three years later. Masduki 
was arrested in 1982 because of  his involvement in Komando Jihad and released in 
1984. See, International Crisis Group, Recycling Militants in Indonesia: Darul Islam and the 
Australian Embassy Bombing, 23 February 2003, pp. 20-21. 
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The main goals of  Masduki’s cabinet were to build international support 
and to strengthen Darul Islam’s military capability. Sungkar focused on 
raising funds in the Middle East and Broto was assigned to streamline 
the sending of  Darul Islam recruits to Afghanistan. 
At some point in 1988, Masduki, accompanied by Sungkar and 
Ba’asyir, travelled to Afghanistan where they met with Abdul Robbir Rasul 
Sayyaf  and Abdullah Azzam. The trip to Afghanistan had unforeseen 
consequences. The exposure to the Sayyaf  circle provoked Masduki into 
thinking in terms of  a caliphate as their ultimate objective, rather than 
the narrower goal of  an Islamic state in Indonesia. Some Darul Islam 
cadres saw Masduki and his men deviating from Darul Islam’s guidelines 
and others were displeased that Masduki behaved like a tourist (despite 
wearing trousers that covered the knees, Masduki insisted on going around 
the camp in shorts), that he could not speak Arabic, asking Sungkar 
to speak on behalf  of  the group, and that his preaching, from a sala>fi> 
perspective, included objectionable superstition (ilmu laduni).48 
The lengthy travel brought a consequence of  the split between 
Sungkar and Masduki. It culminated in 1992 when Sungkar, a puritanical 
salafi, accused Masduki of  sufism tendencies. Conversely, Masduki 
questioned Sungkar’s accounting for the funds used for the Afghanistan 
training. He also said that Sungkar had personalised the Darul Islam 
induction oath so that now recruits swore loyalty to him rather than 
to the organisation. Moreover, Sungkar accused Ajengan Masduki of  
deviating from the Darul Islam and of  collaborating with Ali Murtopo’s 
right-hand, Adah Jaelani.49 The official split occurred on 1 January 1993 
when Darul Islam’s cadres in Afghanistan had to choose and to renew 
their oath or allegiance (bai‘a) to one of  two imāms. Those who preferred 
48 Ilmu laduni simply defined is God-given knowledge. The person with this 
knowledge is believed to know without learning and able to predict the future. Such 
belief  is very popular among traditionalist Indonesian Muslims and most of  the time 
it is identified as the kyai’s supernatural capacity.
49 Adah Jaelani became the Darul Islam imam on 1 July 1979. Ajengan Masduki 
and Sungkar contested the appointment of  the imam because he was accused of  aban-
doning jihad. Since the death of  Adah Jaelani, Darul Islam was divided into two broad 
factions; fillah, devoted to Adah Jaelani, and fisabilillah, who follow Ajengan Masduki 
and Abdullah Sungkar. “Surga di Pelupuk Mata” (Heaven just in the near eyes) in Tempo 
Magazine, Ed. 33/XXXII/13-19 October 2003 and International Crisis Group, Recycling 
Militants in Indonesia, pp. 10-1.
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to be on Ajengan Masduki side had to halt their military training in 
Afghanistan, but those who favoured Sungkar and Ba’asyir could continue 
the training. The event, according to Nasir Abbas, a Malaysian who joined 
the military camp in Afghanistan, signalled the official establishment of  
Jamaah Islamiyyah, which refers to the Sungkar faction, separated from 
Masduki’s Darul Islam.50 
However, during their exile, Sungkar and Ba’asyir found a safe 
haven in Malaysia where they lived and preached openly. Sometime in the 
years between 1985 and 1999, they travelled to Singapore and delivered 
speeches in the Arabic School, the Islamic Center in Kampong Glam.51 
Through sermons, they advocated the creation of  dawla Islāmiyya (Islamic 
state) which eventually would be transformed into khilāfa Islāmiyya52. In 
1991, Sungkar and Ali Ghufron alias Mukhlas, later well-known as one of  
the masterminds of  the 2002 Bali bombing,53 established the Pesantren 
Lukman al-Hakim in Johore54 and the Association of  Malaysian Mujahidin 
(Kumpulan Mujahidin Malaysia/KMM).55 Through the pesantren and 
association, Sungkar and Ba’asyir attracted Malaysians and Indonesians 
to participate in the al-Qaeda military camp in Afghanistan, in Jamaah 
Islamiyyah’s military camp in Mindano-Southern Philippines, Hudaibiyah 
50 Nasir Abas, Membongkar Jamaah Islamiyah, pp. 85-6. 
51 “Stempel JI dari Singapura”, in Tempo Magazine, Ed. 36/XXXI/04-10 No-
vember 2002. 
52 “Suharto’s Detect, Defect and Destroy Policy towards the Islamic Move-
ments”, interview with Abdullah Sungkar, Nida’ul Islam, February-March 1997 quoted 
in Zachari Abuza, Militant Islam in Southeast Asia, p. 127.
53 On 12 October 2002, two coordinated bombs, the so-called Bali bombings, 
exploded in Sari Club and Paddy’s Café, Legian-Kuta, Bali, killed 202 people with 
hundreds wounded.  
54 Sidney Jones, “The Changing Nature of  Jemaah Islamiyah” in Australian 
Journal of  International Affairs, Vol. 59, No. 2, June 2005, pp. 171.
55 The KMM stems from the Association of  Islamic Fighters of  Perak (Kumpu-
lan Perjuangan Islam Perak/KPIK) and the Association of  the Kedah Jihad Fighters 
(Kumpulan Mujahidin Kedah/KMK), founded in 1988. The association was intended to 
establish the Malaysia Islamic state through military invasion. In the 1990s, these as-
sociations were fused into the KMM which has as its objective, among others, to unify 
the former fighters of  the Afghan War in Malaysia. Ibid. pp. 174-5 and “Al-Qaidah di 
Asia Tenggara?”, in Tempo Magazine, Ed. 47/XXX/21-27 January 2002.
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camp.56 All of  this gave way to the establishment of  Mujahidin alliance 
in Southeast Asia, the Rabit\at al-Muja>hidi>n,57 and the formation of  a 
joint coalition for their actions. With a loose alliance with other jihadist 
movements in Southeast Asia, such as the Moro Islamic Liberation 
Front (MILF) and the Abu Sayyaf  Group (ASG),58 Jamaah Islamiyyah 
became an intermediary and important supporter of  those movements 
and their attacks.59
In addition, Jamaah Islamiyyah is also believed to have strong ties to 
al-Qaeda. The connection started when Sungkar travelled to Afghanistan 
56 The Hudaibiyah camp in Mindano started its military training in December 
1994. It is a military training of  Jamaah Islamiyyah which was intended to train the MILF 
militias and a number of  Indonesians and Malaysians. When the Philippine authorities 
attacked the camp, Jamaah Islamiyyah’s training camp was moved to Poso at some 
point in 1999-2000. Abas, Membongkar Jamaah Islamiyah, pp. 148-51 and “Setapak Jejak 
Umar Al-Faruq”, in Tempo Magazine, Ed. 31/XXXI/30 September-06 October 2002.
57 See Sidney Jones, “The Changing Nature of  Jemaah Islamiyah”, p. 171; 
Kumar Ramakrishna, “Delegitimizing Global Jihadi Ideology in Southeast Asia” in 
Contemporary Southeast Asia, 27, no. 3 (2005), p. 321, Rohan Gunaratna, “Ideology in 
Terrorism and Counter Terrorism: Lessons from combating Al Qaeda and Al Jemaah 
Al Islamiyah in Southeast Asia”, p. 20, “Akhir Pelarian Hambali”, in Tempo Magazine, 
Ed. 25/XXXII/18-24 August 2003. 
58 The relationship between Jamaah Islamiyyah, the MILF and Abu Sayyaf  
Group goes back to a key figure in the Afghanistan training camps, Fathur Rahman 
al-Ghozi aka Mike aka Randy Ali. Born on 17 Februari 1971 in Madiun, he studied 
in Ngruki from 1982-1989 before leaving to join military training in Afghanistan in 
1990. It was in Afghanistan where he met Abdulrajak Janjalani, the founder of  the 
Abu Sayyaf  Group and became a close friend of  two MILF fighters, Salahuddin and 
Habib, who worked with him on the so-called Rizal Day bombing, in December 2000. 
Al-Ghozi was detained in Manila since January 2002 on charges of  illegal possession 
of  explosives and falsification of  documents. On 18 July 2003, al-Ghozi escaped from 
his detention centre in the Philippines and was shot to death three months later in 
Cotabaco City. See, Sidney Jones, “The Changing Nature of  Jemaah Islamiyah”, pp. 
174-5; International Crisis Group, al-Qaeda in Southeast Asia, p. 2 , “Al-Ghozi Terantuk 
Bukti”, in Tempo Magazine, Ed. 02/XXXI/11-17 March 2002, “Al-Qaidah “made in” 
Madiun?”, in Tempo Magazine, Ed. 48/XXX/28 January-03 February 2002, “Fakta atau 
Propaganda Amerika?”, in Tempo Magazine, Ed. 48/XXX/28 January-03 February 
2002 and International Crisis Group, Jemaah Islamiyah in Southeast Asia: Damaged but Still 
Dangerous, 26 August 2003, p. 6.
59 Angel M. Rabasa, Political Islam in Southeast Asia: Moderates, Radicals and Terror-
ists (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003).
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and met Osama bin Laden in 1993–1994.60 Following Sungkar’s meeting 
with Osama bin Laden, Ba’asyir and Sungkar charged Hambali and Abu 
Jibril with establishing a network of  militant cells throughout Southeast 
Asia. Although Jamaah Islamiyyah was not a creation of  al-Qaeda, its 
leadership looked to al-Qaeda for inspiration, training, and financial 
assistance during Jamaah Islamiyyah’s formative years. In return, al-Qaeda 
gained the advantage of  Jamaah Islamiyyah’s covert infrastructure to 
support its attacks. In January 2000, some Jamaah Islamiyyah’s members, 
including Hambali, had a meeting in Kuala Lumpur with several high-
level al-Qaeda operatives, including two 9/11 hijackers and others who 
were involved in planning the attack on the USS Cole in October 2000.61 
Similarly, al-Qaeda’s planned bomb attacks on U.S. and Western interests 
in Singapore in late 2001, which were eventually blocked, depended 
heavily on Jamaah Islamiyyah’s clandestine infrastructure and local 
knowledge for surveillance of  the targets and for building the truck 
bombs.62
In Indonesia, Jamaah Islamiyyah worked in tandem with many 
jihadist groups that were active in Indonesia’s ongoing sectarian conflicts.63 
During the Moluccas conflicts, they provided secure training facilities, 
increased logistical support and opportunities to undertake joint-operations 
for jihadist groups, such as Laskar Mujahidin,64 Laskar Jundullah65 and 
60 Rohan K. Gunaratna, Political and security outlook 2003: Terrorism in Southeast Asia: 
What to Expect (Singapore: Institute of  Southeast Asian Studies (ISEAS), 2003), p. 174.
61 Zachary Abuza, Militant Islam in Southeast Asia: Crucible of  Terror (Boulder, 
Colorado: Lynne Rienner, 2003), p. 123 and Rohan Gunaratna, Inside Al Qaeda: Global 
Network of  Terror (New York: Columbia University Press, 2002), pp. 195-6. 
62 Brian A. Jackson, John C. Baker, et al., Aptitude for Destruction: Volume 2 (Case 
Studies of  Organisational Learning in Five Terrorist Groups), p. 65.
63 Tito Karnavian, at, al., Indonesia Top Secret: Membongkar Konflik Poso, Operasi 
dan Penindakan Pelaku Kekerasan di Sulawesi Tengah (Jakarta: Gramedia Pustaka Utama, 
2008), pp. 174-5.
64 Laskar Mujahidin was the most aggressive and well equipped militia in the 
Moluccas conflict. It was a loose alliance of  a dozen minor Muslim paramilitary or-
ganisations that had been scattered among cities such as Solo, Yogyakarta, Kebumen, 
Purwokerto, Tasikmalaya and Makassar. See: Noorhaidi, Laskar Jihad: Islam, Militancy, and 
the Quest for Identity in Post-New Order Indonesia (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University, Southeast 
Asia Program, 2006) and Angel M. Rabasa, Political Islam in Southeast Asia, pp. 28-31.
65 Laskar Jundullah was a regional militia in South Sulawesi, claiming a his-
torical connection with the Darul Islam movement of  that province. It was led by 
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the Committee for Tackling Crisis (Komite Penanggulangan Krisis/
Kompak).66 It also built a strong connection and formed loose alliances 
with Indonesian pesantrens, such as pesantren al-Muttaqien in Jepara, Dar 
al-Sa’adah in Boyolali, al-Islam in Lamongan and pesantren Hidayatullah 
which has 127 branches around the archipelago. Several of  those became 
places of  shelter or transit for Jamaah Islamiyyah’s member, of  meetings 
and of  transferring ideas.67
Apart from the above formal alliances, Jamaah Islamiyyah extended 
its networks through informal alliances, such as marriage. Therefore, it 
made Jamaah Islamiyyah resemble one large extended family.68 A number 
of  marriages took place between Indonesians and Malaysians, showing 
a strong bond between the two peoples in the past few years during the 
exile. For instance, Ali Ghufron, one of  the key operatives in the first 
Bali bombing, is married to the younger sister of  Nassir bin Abbas, the 
former head of  Jamaah Islamiyyah commander for Malaysia. Two of  
Ali Ghufron’s brothers, Ali Imron and Amrozi, were deeply involved in 
the Bali bombing. Ali Fauzi, one of  the Bali bombers, is Ali Ghufron’s 
half-brother. Kinship bonds also extended to in-laws. Yazid Suffat 
became more religious through his wife’s urging. He studied with senior 
members of  Jamaah Islamiyyah, and ended up joining that organisation 
and was the host of  the Kuala Lumpur al-Qaeda conference leading to 
the USS Cole bombing and the 9/11 attacks. Haris Fadillah arranged the 
marriage of  his daughter, Mira Agustina, to Umar al-Faruq, an al-Qaeda 
Agus Dwikarna who was arrested in the Philippines, in March 2002.  See: Martin van 
Bruinessen, “the Violent Fringes of  Indonesia’s radical Islam” in ISIM Newsletter, No. 
11 (December 2002), p. 7, “Agus Dwikarna” in Tempo Magazine, Ed. 44/XXXI/30 
December-05 January 2003. 
66 Kompak was a militant Muslim group in South Sulawesi headed by Tansil 
Linrung, a Dewan Dakwah Islamiyah Indonesia (DDII), the vice-leader of  Komite 
Persiapan Penerapan Shari’at Islam (KPPSI) activist as well as one of  high-ranking 
officers of  the MMI. He was arrested on 11 March 2002 on charges of  entering the 
Philippines illegally and the possession of  explosives. See, “Al-Qaidah dari Makassar, 
Katanya” (Reportedly al-Qaeda from Makassar) in Tempo Magazine, Ed. 04/XXXI/25 
- 31 March 2002 and “Tamsil Ditangkap, atau Dijebak?” (Tamsil: Arrested or trapped) 
in Tempo Magazine, Ed. 03/XXXI/18-24 March 2002. 
67 International Crisis Group, Jamaah Islamiyyah in Southeast Asia: Damaged but 
Still Dangerous, 26 August 2003.
68 Bilveer Singh, The Talibanization of  Southeast Asia, pp. 79-80. 
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representative in Southeast Asia.69 
In addition, as an organisation, Jamaah Islamiyyah consists of  a 
structured leadership with the ’amīr or supreme leader at the top level of  
the organisational body and the regional shu>ra> as a consultative council of  
senior JI members. At the operational levels, Jamaah Islamiyyah consists 
of  four territorial groups (mant\i>qis); mant\i>qi 1 is centred in Malaysia with 
a branch in Singapore; mant\i>qi 2 covers most of  Indonesia and probably 
is the source of  many JI operatives; mant\i>qi 3 has been important for 
training Jamaah Islamiyyah’s personnel and supporting its logistical 
network; and mantiqi 4 is in Australia focusing primarily on recruiting 
and fundraising in the large Indonesian Diaspora community.70 While 
manti>qis are based on geographical commands, the lowest level of  Jamaah 
Islamiyyah’s structure, fi>’ah (cell), is the ground-level and has more 
operational autonomy to take action. Furthermore, it seems that the fi>’ah 
was significantly growing after the top-leaders of  Jamaah Islamiyyah were 
under pressure and arrested by authorities during 1999-2004. In 2003, 
for instance, mantiqi 2 expanded into the district level (kabupaten) in their 
operation. In Central Java, it produced fi>’ah for 6 regions (Pati, Semarang 1, 
Semarang 2, Kedu, Pekalongan and Banyumas) and successfully recruited 
69 Umar al-Faruq was born in Kuwait on 24 May 1971. He married Mira Agustina, 
a santri of  pesantren al-Muttaqin, Jepara, Central Java, on 26 July. From his marriage, he 
has two children, now living with their mother in Cijeruk, Bogor, West Java. In 1990, he 
participated in the al-Qaeda Khaldan camp training and went to the Philippines where 
he taught at the Abu Bakar military training camp of  the MILF. When the conflict 
between Muslims and Christians in Poso culminated in 2000, he taught Indonesian 
militias on military weapons and war strategies and was the master-mind behind the 
coordinated Christmas bombings in December 2000. He was arrested in Indonesia on 
5 June 2002 and brought to the United States for interrogation. Noor Huda Ismail, 
“Understanding how Jihadists in Indonesia rejuvenate themselves”, IRRI-paper presented 
at IRII-KIIB (now The Royal Institute for International Relations) conference, Brussels on 
30 March 2006, p. 7, “Dasamuka yang Gemar Menyaru”, in Tempo Magazine, Ed. 39/
XXXI/25 November-01 December 2002, “Rencana Besar Al-Faruq Al-Kuwaity”, in 
Tempo Magazine, Ed. 30/XXXI/23-29 September 2002, “Setapak Jejak Umar Al-Faruq”, 
in Tempo Magazine, Ed. 31/XXXI/30 September - 06 October 2002 and “Jaringan 
Bom Laknat di Malam Kudus”, in Tempo Magazine, Ed. 2001-0//08 - 14 January 2001.
70 Zachary Abuza, Militant Islam in Southeast Asia: Crucible of  Terror (Boulder, 
Colorado: Lynne Rienner, 2003), Brian A. Jackson, John C. Baker, Aptitude for Destruc-
tion, p. 63.
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141 members.71 The growth of  fi’ah is in tandem with the flourishing 
of  Jamaah Islamiyyah’s military cell-groups. For instance, Zulkarnaen, 
a former Afghan fighter as well as Ngruki’s teacher, built the so-called 
Laskar Istimata72 and Noordin M. Top (killed in 2009) and Azahari (killed 
in 2005), established Thoifah Muqatilah;73 both are suicide-troops of  
the Jamaah Islamiyyah. In July 2009, Noordin M. Top transformed the 
troop into Tandzim al-Qaida and initiated the second Marriot and Ritz 
hotels suicide bombings.
D. A New Rupture?
When Abdullah Sungkar died in November 1999, shortly after 
his return to Indonesia, Ba’asyir was named his successor as the head 
of  Jamaah Islamiyyah. Some of  Sungkar’s recruits were very unhappy 
with the idea of  Ba’ayir taking over. They were, amongst others, Riduan 
Isamuddin alias Hambali, Abdul Aziz alias Imam, Ali Gufron alias 
Muchlas and Abdullah Anshori alias Abu Fatih. They saw Ba’asyir as 
too weak, too accommodating and too easily influenced by others.74 The 
split worsened when Ba’asyir, together with Irfan Suryahardi Awwas, 
founded the Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia (MMI) in August 2000. This 
rupture among the activists of  Jamaah Islamiyyah is understandable for 
three reasons. Firstly, according to the Operation Manual of  Jamaah 
Islamiyyah, the General Guide for the Struggle of  Jamaah Islamiyyah 
(Pedoman Umum Perjuangan Jamaah Islamiyyah/PUPJI), Jamaah Islamiyyah 
is a tandīm al-sirr (secret organisation) and the establishment of  the 
MMI was deviating from this fundamental stipulation. Secondly, the 
establishment of  the MMI brings activists to the soft movement which is 
clearly contested through PUPJI. Thirdly and consequently, the military 
71 “Satu Ton Bom di Kios Sandal”, in Tempo Magazine, Ed. 33/XXXII/13-19 
October 2003. 
72 “Jenderal Laskar Istimata”, in Tempo Magazine, Ed. 33/XXXII/13-19 October 
2003.
73 “Azahari Diburu, Azahari Merekrut”, in Tempo Magazine, Ed. 33/XXX-
IV/10-16 October 2005, “Sayap Garis Keras itu Bernama Thoifah Muqatilah”, in Tempo 
Magazine, Edisi. 34/XXXIV/17 - 23 Oktober 2005.
74 International Crisis Group, Indonesia Backgrounder: How the Jamaah Islamiyyah 
Terrorist Network Operates, 11 December 2002, p. 3 and “Komplotan Baru Pak Guru 
Dujana”, in Tempo Magazine, Ed. 07/XXXIIIIII/09-15 April 2007.
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operation methods, which were described and prescribed in the PUPJI, 
consequently would be abandoned.75 Therefore, Abu Dujana, the former 
secretary of  Abdullah Sungkar in Jamaah Islamiyyah, accused Ba’asyir of  
deviating from Abdullah Sungkar and the nature of  Jamaah Islamiyyah.76 
Prior to the first Bali Bombings in 2002, some meetings reportedly 
were held in Surabaya, Lamongan, Mojokerto and other places, between 
the MMI and Jamaah Islamiyyah activists. Ba’asyir urged that bombing 
and armed struggle for an Islamic state should be put on hold for the time 
being because they would have negative repercussions for the movement.77 
Ba’asyir’s advice was poorly received among Jamaah Islamiyyah’s members 
and, while continuing to show respect and acknowledging him as the 
head of  Jamaah Islamiyyah, they began searching for a new leader, closer 
to their way of  thinking. Some names arose to replace Ba’asyir, such as 
Thoriquddin alias Abu Rusdan alias Hamzah78 and Abu Dujana alias 
Ainul Bahri alias Yusron Mahmud.79
Although Ba’asyir’s leadership was contested by a number of  
Jamaah Islamiyyah activists, he received much respect from other Jamaah 
Islamiyyah activists. He was the de jure leader of  Jamaah Islamiyyah. 
Samudra and Mukhlas, two perpetrators of  the Bali bombings, for 
instance, met Ba’asyir in 2003 to get permission from the ’amīr to commit 
the Bali bombings. Likewise, Ba’asyir has shown his sympathy toward the 
perpetrators of  the bombings. On 15 December 2007, Ba’asyir, together 
with thirteen members of  the MMI, visited Imam Samudra and Muchlas, 
the two master-minds of  the Bali bombings, in their detention centres. On 
many occasions, Ba’asyir pronounced in the media that those who killed 
75 Al-Jamaah al-Islamiyyah, The General Guide for the Struggle of  Jamaah Islamiyyah 
(Pedoman Umum Perjuangan Jamaah Islamiyyah/PUPJI), 30 May 1996, and “Surga di 
Pelupuk Mata”, in Tempo Magazine, Ed. 33/XXXII/13-19 October 2003.
76 “Abu Dujana: Saya Marah kepada Noor Din”, in Tempo Magazine, Ed. 17/
XXXIIIIII/18-24 June 2007. 
77 Abu Bakar Ba’asyir at the center of  controversy “ at http://www.thejakartapost.
com/news/2003/03/08/abu-bakar-ba039asyir-center-controversy.html (accessed 1 November 
2008).
78 “Abu Rusdan: Kehebatan Abu Dujana Hanyalah Imajinasi”, in Tempo Magazine 
Ed. 06/XXXIIIIII/02-8 April 2007. 
79 Zachary Abuza, “Abu Dujana: Jamaah Islamiyyah’s New al-Qaeda Linked 
Leader”, Jamestown Foundation, Terrorism Focus, 3 (13), 4 April 2006.
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themselves in the Marriott bombing and the Bali bombings are martyrs.80 
Similarly, the head of  MMI, Awwas, also showed a half-hearted stance 
towards the perpetrators of  the bombings. In spite of  condemning the 
perpetrators, Awwas accused the United States of  threatening, through a 
global campaign against terrorism, Islamic movements that are devoted to 
their mission to establish shari>’a.81 On 10 March 2002, the MMI issued an 
“official opinion on international terrorism” endorsing terrorism and in 
reverse accused the US of  being a “terrorist state”. The official opinion 
itself  was claimed as a result of  a consensus among MMI’s leaders and 
was signed by its top leader, the so-called ’amīr al-mujāhidīn, Abu Bakar 
Ba’asyir.82 
The relationship between Ba’asyir and the MMI lasted eight years 
until suddenly Ba’asyir resigned from his position as the ’amīr of  the 
MMI on 19 July 2008 and founded Jamaah Ansharut Tauhid (JAT) on 17 
September 2008.83 The resignation was caused by a disagreement between 
Ba’asyir and Awwas about authority and control over the MMI.84 The 
public appearance for the resignation was the model of  leadership of  Ahl 
al-H{al wa’l-‘Aqd (AHWA), a supreme body of  the MMI which Ba’asyir 
himself  led. Through his fatwā, Ba’asyir argues that the MMI’s structure 
of  organisation follows the “Jewish tradition” (sunnah Yahudi), not the 
imāma by which an ’amīr can act and decide freely as he proposed.85. 
Therefore, the ’amīr is able to act with or without first consulting on 
the decision with the AHWA members, and has the authority to take 
80 “Ba’asyir Keluarkan Fatwā Al Ghozi Mati Syahid”, in http://www.tempointeraktif.
com/hg/nasional/2003/10/18/brk,20031018-10,id.html, accessed 9 June 2008.
81 Irfan S. Awwas, “Menegakkan Syariat tanpa Teror”, in Tempo Magazine, Ed. 
38/XXXI/18-24 November 2002.
82 Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia, Official Opinion on International Terrorism, issued 
on 10 March 2002.
83 “Kepenatan itu Terbayar”, in http://abbcenter.org/index.php?option=com_content
&view=article&id=88:kepenatan-itu-terbayar&catid=10:dari-redaksi&Itemid=10 (accessed 
8 October 2008).
84 “Ustad Berpisah Jamaah Terbelah”, in Gatra Magazine,  No. 39 /XIV 13 
August 2008.
85 Jamaah Islamiyyah also the imāma model as declared in the PUPJI. See, Al-
Jamaah al-Islamiyyah, Pedoman Umum Perjuangan Jamaah Islamiyyah (Majlis Qiyadah 
Markaziyah), 30 May 1996, chapter 24: point 7 and pp. 5-6 and Zachary Abuza, “The 
State of  Jamaah Islamiyyah” in The Fletcher Forum of  World Affairs, Vol. 28:1, Winter 
2004, p. 96.
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any decision, even when other council members do not agree with his 
decision.86 Responding to Ba’asyir’s fatwā, Awwas accused Ba’asyir of  
being arrogant and forcing his own perspective on the MMI. The MMI 
is not deviating from the shari>’a, it deviates from Ba’asyir’s point of  view.87 
Furthermore, M. Thalib, the new ‘amīr of  the MMI, claimed Ba’asyir’s 
model of  leadership followed Shiite-Islam, the Ahmadiyah, as well as 
being a Communist model of  leadership.88
Apart from the above-mentioned reasons, there might be another 
factor behind the resignation of  Ba’asyir, namely the hijra creed which 
Ba’asyir said was the core method of  his struggle, Jamaah Islamiyyah’s 
model of  strengthening military power through establishing the truthful 
community or even by flight to the safe area as mentioned throughout 
the PUPJI. To do so, in 2006, Ba’asyir published a book with the name 
“Notes from the Prison to Uphold and Establish Islam” (Catatan dari 
Penjara untuk Mengamalkan dan Menegakkan Dinul Islam) in which he 
emphasises again the importance of  the hijra method.89 Therefore, it 
seems that Ba’asyir was dissatisfied with the MMI, which was becoming 
more and more involved in politics through its activities and leaving the 
creation of  a truly Islamic community and hijra doctrine aside.90 In other 
words, the MMI has deviated from truthful methods of  establishing 
religion and become a counter-state movement instead of  a counter-
86 “Abu Bakar Ba’asyir: Ini Pembunuhan Karakter”, in Gatra Magazine, No. 
39/XIV 13 August 2008, “Surat Pernyataan Amirul Mujahidin Abu Bakar Ba’asyir” 
(Official Letter of  Amirul Mujahidin, Abu Bakar Ba’asyir) in http://abbcenter.org/
index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=66:pernyataan-mundur&catid=22:pernyata
an&Itemid=59 (accessed 8 October 2008), “Ustad Ba’asyir Mengundurkan Diri dari 
Majelis Mujahidin”, http://www.eramuslim.com/berita/nas/8805155942-ustad-ba039asyir-
mengundurkan-diri-majelis-mujahidin.htm (accessed 6 August 2008). 
87 “Ustadz Abu Bakar Ba’asyir Disuruh Mundur Irfan”, at http://infojihad.
wordpress.com/2008/08/07/ustadz-abu-bakar-baasyir-disuruh-mundur-irfan/ (accessed 10 
August 2008) and “Pimpinan MMI Harapkan Ba’asyir Hadiri Kongres”, in Republika, 
8 August 2008, “Kongres MMI Tanpa Ba’asyir”, in Suara Merderka, 10 August 2008, 
“Kepenatan itu Terbayar”.
88 “Muhammad Thalib: Syiah, Ahmadiyah dan Komunis”, in Gatra Magazine ed. 
39/XIV 13 August 2008.
89 Abu Bakar Ba’asyir, Catatan dari Penjara: Untuk Mengamalkan dan Menegakkan 
Dinul Islam (Depok: Mushaf, 2006).
90 Syaifudin Zuhri, “Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia: Ideology, Militancy and Polio-
tics”, MA Thesis, Leiden University, 2009.
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society movement as mentioned throughout the de facto manifesto and 
operational practices of  Jamaah Islamiyyah. 91 
However, it is interesting to examine the post-Ba’asyir MMI. 
Unlike when it was under Ba’asyir, the current MMI was not involved 
in defending the Bali bombing perpetrators a few days prior to their 
execution on 8 November 2008. Instead of  organising a demonstration 
against the death execution or delivering a fatwā like Ba’asyir’s JAT 
did, the MMI did not respond to this issue. Contrary to the MMI, the 
JAT accused the government of  killing truthful mujahidin when the 
perpetrators were shot to death. Another important development of  the 
MMI is that it shows a willingness to uncover the controversy concerning 
the existence of  Jamaah Islamiyyah, different form the previous MMI’s 
stance when it denied its existence. This can be seen from a comment of  
the new leader of  the MMI, Muhammad Thalib, who acknowledges that 
there are three powerful factions within the MMI that tried to control 
the organisation; the Indonesian military, Jamaah Islamiyyah, and the 
MMI.92 This contemporary development needs further research, including 
the post-Ba’asyir era of  the MMI and the JAT that increasingly gained 
sympathy and members, particularly after the execution of  the first Bali 
bombing perpetrators.
E. Conclusion
The aforementioned episodes reveal that Jamaah Islamiyyah stems 
from the Kartosuwiryo’s Darul Islam rebellion in the 1940s, which had 
as its main objective the establishment of  an Indonesian Islamic state. 
During the New Order regime, this ideal was revived by the Darul 
Islam-like, Jihad Command, which was the creation of  Ali Murtopo, 
who initiated former activists of  Darul Islam into organising themselves. 
91 Pavlona differentiates between “a counter-society” and “a counter-state 
movement”. The differentiation is made on the basis of  the stated goals and objectives 
of  the movement. The latter typically refers to movements that violently challenge or 
seek to overthrow the existing structures of  power, the state and its governing ap-
paratus. The former connotes movements that conceptualise themselves primarily as 
alternative forms of  social collectivity and organisation rather than confront the state 
directly. Elena Pavlona, “From Counter-Society to a Counter-State Movement: Jemaah 
Islamiyyah According to PUPJI” in Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, 30/2007, p. 778.
92 Muhammad Thalib, “Syiah Ahmadiyah dan Komunis”.
Syaifudin Zuhri
Al-Ja>mi‘ah, Vol. 48, No. 1, 2010 M/1431 H72
From the New Order government’s point of  view, the creation of  
Jihad Command was intended to break up the Islamic party voters in 
the 1977 elections and to attract Islamic voters to choose the Golkar. 
Despite following the state’s scenario, Jihad Command turned against 
the government, contested the government’s initiation of  Pancasila as 
the sole ideology and made a loose alliance among activists under the 
banner of  Jamaah Islamiyyah, headed by Abdullah Sungkar and Abu 
Bakar Ba’asyir.
In 1985, Sungkar and Ba’asyir fled to Malaysia where they 
continuously campaigned against the government, sent hundreds of  
Indonesians and Malaysians for military training with al-Qaeda leaders 
and participation in the Afghanistan war (1979-89). The battlefield created 
links between both clerics and their followers and other Islamic militants 
in the Middle East and in Southeast Asia. It was in 1993 that Sungkar 
and Ba’asyir transformed Jamaah Islamiyyah into a transnational jihadist 
group with the ideal of  establishing khilāfa through jihad and organized 
terror attacks in Southeast Asia. 
In 1999, when the Reformation era (era reformasi) had just begun, 
Ba’syir and Sungkar went back to Indonesia. In the same year, the 
’amīr of  Jamaah Islamiyyah passed away and his position was taken by 
Abu Bakar Ba’asyir. From the very beginning, some militants within 
Jamaah Islamiyyah contested Ba’asyir’s leadership. It worsened when 
Ba’asyir, together with his old cadre and network of  ‘usra activists, Irfan 
Suryahardi Awwas, and some Jamaah Islamiyyah’s actitivists founded 
MMI, which became the public face of  Jamaah Islamiyyah, thereby 
integrating some parts of  Jamaah Islamiyyah into the new Indonesian 
politics. The cooperation of  Ba’asyir and MMI endured for eight years 
until suddenly Ba’asyir resigned from his position as top leader of  the 
MMI and founded his JAT in September 2008. In this way, he gained 
full control of  the organisation, demonstrated his invaluable respect to 
his cadres, who committed and initiated terror attacks, and established 
the counter-society movement as his method of  struggle.
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